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The G-7 countries’ June 5 accord to implement
a global minimum corporate tax rate promises to
set off frenzied negotiations among nations
regarding coordinated international tax reform.
Finance ministers from the G-20 countries met in
Venice on July 9-10, after this magazine went to
press. Whether members of the G-7 club can
persuade the larger group to endorse their
minimum tax proposal will determine what
mandate the OECD receives to continue the
(re-)negotiations under pillars 1 and 2 of its
program of work to develop a consensus solution.
How will China respond to the G-7 proposal at the
G-20 meeting? That question is especially
intriguing, given the growing political
antagonisms between China and some G-7
countries.1
This article offers some broad reflections on
how well aligned China’s recent international tax

policy choices are with the G-7’s minimum tax
proposal. The reflections are based on analyses of
Chinese tax law and policy, and not on recent
pronouncements by Chinese political leaders,
diplomats, or commentators. The aim is not to
predict the positions the Chinese government will
take at the meeting or during further OECD
negotiations; instead, it is to identify several tax
policy priorities that emerged in recent years for
the Chinese government that may be affected by
the G-7’s global minimum tax proposal. In
particular, it argues that in several striking ways,
China can be seen as facing policy choices similar
to many the United States has confronted.
Recent speculations about China’s
international tax policy have been made more
often in connection with the OECD’s pillar 1
proposals, such as whether China may desire to
protect its technological titans from digital
services taxes or welcome greater profit allocation
to market jurisdictions. As pillar 2 ideas drive
proposed international negotiations and the scope
of pillar 1 shrinks, the questions facing China (and
many other countries) are different. Arguably, the
global minimum tax proposal is more important
for China than even the OECD’s earlier pillar 1
blueprint, let alone any “pillar 1 light” that may
2
emerge in the coming months.
The shifting emphasis of political discussions
from pillar 1 to pillar 2 calls for one additional
preliminary remark. It should be obvious that the
position China (or any country, for that matter)
takes toward OECD negotiations will depend on
what the negotiations are about, including
whether they have any substance. The G-7’s recent
announcement, reflecting the new U.S. policy
agenda under the Biden administration, is touted

1

James T. Areddy, “The G-7’s Global Tax Deal Faces a China Test,” The
Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2021; and Karla Adam et al., “G-7 Takes
Stronger Stand Against China, at U.S. Urging,” The Washington Post, June
13, 2021.
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For a provocative proposal to give pillar 1 more substance, see
Mitchell Kane and Adam Kern, “Progressive Formulary Apportionment:
The Case for ‘Amount D,’” Tax Notes Int’l, June 14, 2021, p. 1483.
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first and foremost as about strengthening the
corporate income tax throughout the world and
ending the “race to the bottom” of tax
competition. Yet just less than half a year ago, the
OECD stated that the main purpose of
international tax cooperation was to end the
undesirable proliferation of unilateral taxes — a
race to the top in which small, open economies
3
hasten to impose taxes on foreign multinationals.
That gives the impression that countries favor
coordination on international tax matters to such
an extent that any kind of race, either up or down,
4
is too disorderly.
Of course, the apparent versatility of
international cooperation has also led many to
suggest that other than complexity, very little will
change. But if very little of substance changes, it is
also humdrum to predict what China (or any
other country) will do in a sheer game of
diplomacy (and bargaining for bargaining’s sake).
Therefore, this article considers how China might
respond to more substantive versions of global
minimum tax proposals, whether or not those
versions will eventually be agreed to or are even
under serious discussion.
China and the United States are remarkably
similar in their aversion to using consumption
and personal income tax (PIT) instruments to
raise revenue and their preference for the
corporate income tax (CIT). Both also drifted
away from a paradigm of taxing the foreign
income of multinationals that the United States
first adopted in the 1960s. While the United States
did so over the course of four decades, China did
so in just one. The extent to which each is willing
or able to halt that drift is what is at stake in the
current global minimum tax debate. Taking
another page from a book familiar to U.S.

3

OECD, “Tax Challenges Arising From Digitalisation — Economic
Impact Assessment,” at 11 (Nov. 2020) (“The absence of a consensusbased solution would likely lead to a proliferation of uncoordinated and
unilateral tax measures (for example, digital services taxes) and an
increase in damaging tax and trade disputes. . . . In the ‘worst-case’
scenario, these disputes could reduce global GDP by more than 1
percent.”).

policymakers, China offers many incentives to
engage in rate-reducing tax competition to attract
foreign investment and promote (quasi-)domestic
financial centers, including Hong Kong. The
meaning of multilateralism in international tax
cooperation, however, differs for the two
countries.
I. The CIT as a Stalwart Revenue Source
The figure offers an overview of the evolution
of China’s tax structure since the late 1990s. The
CIT’s share of total tax revenue (inclusive of social
insurance contributions) generally rose after 1999
and remained steady after 2008, when the
Enterprise Income Tax Law (EITL) unified
previously separate CIT regimes for domesticand foreign-owned companies. The CIT’s share of
total revenue has held up despite substantial rate
cuts during the past decade, the largest of which
were delivered through nominally temporary, but
repeatedly renewed, extra-statutory expansions
of a preferential regime for small- and microprofit enterprises (SMPEs).5 Although the EITL
prescribed a 20 percent rate for SMPEs, beginning
in 2009 the Ministry of Finance and State
Administration of Taxation (SAT) introduced a
series of policies to reduce the rate to 10 percent
for companies under specific asset, employee, and
taxable income thresholds. By 2019 all companies
with less than CNY 50 million (approximately
$7.7 million) in assets, fewer than 300 employees,
and taxable income of less than CNY 1 million
enjoyed a 5 percent CIT rate, while those that
made between CNY 1 million and CNY 3 million
in taxable income had a 10 percent rate.
Because, as in other countries, a large portion
of Chinese corporations are loss making in the
first place, the Chinese government announced in
2019 that the SMPE tax preference extended to
over 95 percent of all Chinese businesses, making
it an “inclusive” tax cut. For CIT liabilities to be
reduced for such a large population of companies
and for CIT revenue to increase at the same time,
some Chinese companies must have become very
profitable.

4

That is among several unusual features of the recent discourse on
international tax coordination discussed in a working paper. See Wei Cui,
“New Puzzles in International Tax Coordination,” SSRN Working Paper
(2021).
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That expansion of the SMPE regime is documented in Cui, The
Administrative Foundations of the Chinese Fiscal State, at ch. 7 (forthcoming
2021).

TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, VOLUME 103, JULY 12, 2021

COMMENTARY & ANALYSIS

The figure also shows that in contrast to the
CIT, the share of taxes on goods and services in
China has declined substantially over the last 20
years. The share of the PIT has also remained
stagnant, at only around one-third of the CIT’s
share.
There are many reasons to expect those trends
to continue. For taxes on goods and services, the
main reason has to do with a reform China
implemented between 2012 and 2016 to combine
VAT and a turnover tax on services called the
business tax. The botched reform retained or
introduced many turnover tax features under
China’s VAT; its resulting inefficiencies (not its
impact on consumer prices) generated strong
political pressure to reduce VAT rates. Thus,
unexpectedly for reform that was supposed to
enhance the efficiency of the indirect tax system,
the highest VAT rate was cut from 17 percent in
2016 to 13 percent in 2019.
Increases in VAT rates seem unlikely in the
near future. Likewise, the Chinese government
has chosen to pander to the urban affluent class by
repeatedly cutting the PIT. Public opinion is easily
mobilized against PIT increases, and given the
TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, VOLUME 103, JULY 12, 2021

tax’s low revenue share, it is also unlikely that the
government will raise it to generate revenue in the
6
next few years.
The only major source of tax revenue that has
shown substantial gain in revenue share is social
insurance contributions. However, those
contributions (by both employers and employees)
significantly increase labor costs, especially for
micro, small, and midsize firms. Pressures to
reduce companies’ social insurance contributions
are therefore also intense — and, unlike the VAT
and PIT, perhaps justifiably so. It is notable,
therefore, that China’s largest fiscal policy
response to COVID-19 in 2020 consisted of
temporary suspensions of major social insurance
7
contributions for the vast majority of companies.

6

For more on the government’s decision to shrink the PIT base in
China and the botched VAT reform, see id. at ch. 6.
7

See Cui, Jeff Hicks, and Max Norton, “How Well-Targeted Are
Payroll Tax Cuts as a Response to COVID-19: Evidence From China,”
SSRN Working Paper (2020).
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Overall, it seems reasonable to project that
Chinese policymakers are more likely to cut VAT
and social insurance rates in the coming years
than they are to raise them. And with CIT revenue
staying healthy despite recent tax cuts, the
government can be predicted to continue to rely
on the CIT.
There is a surprising affinity between China’s
current tax structure and recent U.S. tax policy
choices. In contrast to the United States and other
developed countries, China raises relatively little
revenue from the PIT. The CIT thus serves as an
important substitute for taxing capital income
earned by individuals — that is, shareholders.
However, increasingly, China’s reliance on
that substitute cannot be explained by the lack of
government capacity to collect the PIT (a factor
commonly used to explain low PIT revenue in
developing countries). In the early 2000s, China’s
PIT revenue saw rapid growth as a result of rising
incomes. For the CIT to retain its dominance in
Chinese income taxation, the Chinese
government had to take a series of political
decisions to keep PIT revenue from rising. In
particular, it kept the individual taxation of
capital income low and reduced the PIT liabilities
of all but the top 10 percent of urban wage earners.
The general rationale behind those decisions
seems to be that strongly progressive tax
schedules should be applied only to the very top
(for example, 1 percent) of the income
distribution. That echoes the Biden
administration’s policy not to increase taxes on
Americans with annual income of less than
$400,000.
Similarly, China has the capacity to raise more
revenue through the VAT but, especially in the
last five years, has increasingly turned away from
the VAT as a revenue source. Although that is
mainly because of business criticisms of a poorly
designed system, it is still notable because a welldesigned VAT is regarded as a more efficient tax
than the traditional CIT.
The United States has also spurned a VAT,
even as Democrats aim to substantially and
permanently increase public spending. The
decision to embrace the CIT instead of more
efficient taxation of personal consumption and
shareholder-level taxation thus marks a point of
commonality among the world’s two largest
economies.
144

II. Retreating From Worldwide Taxation
A simple, if perhaps naïve, view of the gist of
the G-7’s global minimum tax proposals is that
capital exporting countries would strengthen
residence-country corporate taxation of the
foreign income of their “own” multinationals.
Instead of acquiescing to the use of tax havens to
achieve either deferral or permanent exemption
from residence-country taxation, foreign income
earned in or shifted to low-tax jurisdictions would
be subject to a residence-country minimum tax on
8
a current basis.
The first thing to note about that policy
objective is that China is one of the few leading
economies that still operate (nominally) a U.S.style worldwide tax system in corporate taxation.
In fact, China embraced that kind of system just as
other major economies began to abandon it. The
EITL (adopted in March 2007) introduced a slew
of new rules to strengthen residence-based
taxation, including rules on controlled foreign
corporations and a management and control
criterion for corporate residence (in addition to
9
the place of incorporation criterion). Those rules
were not adopted based on existing Chinese
practice or revenue needs, but simply borrowed
from what had appeared to be a normative
10
paradigm of international taxation. Yet in 2009,
when the United Kingdom and Japan switched to
the exemption treatment of foreign business
income, Beijing immediately felt doubt: Had
China borrowed the wrong model?
The legislative timing of the EITL was ironic in
another way. In 2006, when the law was drafted,
China’s capital control regime still required all
Chinese companies to repatriate foreign earnings
immediately. The rapid buildup of China’s foreign
currency reserve after the country’s accession to
the WTO had still been so recent that its impact on
China’s commercial and capital control policies

8

In the OECD’s pillar 2 blueprint, that objective is reflected in the
priority of the income inclusion rule over the undertaxed payment rule.
9

For an early overview of the EITL, see Fuli Cao, Corporate Income Tax
Law and Practice in the People’s Republic of China (2011). A more recent
overview can be found in Jinyan Li, International Taxation in China: A
Contextualized Analysis (2016).
10

Two pre-2007 practices — per-country limitations on foreign tax
credits and the denial of deductions of foreign losses against domestic
income — were continued by the EITL. See Cui, “Designing Foreign Tax
Credit Rules in China: The Case of Foreign Loss Limitations,” 38(5) Tax
Mgmt. Int’l J. 277 (2009).
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could not be fully anticipated. Tax specialists even
wondered which companies could have illegally
kept income overseas so that the CFC rules would
have applied. But just as the EITL was enacted,
China’s trade and capital control regimes
underwent major transformations. Outflows of
capital were substantially liberalized — and, in
fact, became necessary — because China
continued to run large trade surpluses.
For many international tax advisers, that
promised a golden age of serving Chinese clients
“going out” by helping them navigate the EITL
antiabuse rules. The Chinese government upped
the ante in the advertising race among tax
advisers by coining the phrase “One Belt, One
Road” in 2013. However, for the last 10 years,
advisers have struggled to articulate what
outbound tax rules their clients should really care
about. The problem is that like tax advisers
elsewhere in the world, those in China
erroneously assumed that international tax policy
and trade policies are independent from each
other.
In reality, of course, those policies are not
independent. The United States’ much-admired
subpart F rules, for example, were enacted while
the country struggled to address a balance of
payment crisis and explored all measures to bring
capital back. Although curbing the use of tax
havens may sound like the right thing to do in any
circumstance, President Kennedy acknowledged
that the real policy motive was that the United
States could “no longer afford existing tax
treatment of foreign income . . . if we are to
emphasize investment in this country in order to
stimulate our economy and our plant
modernization, as well as ease our balance of
11
payments deficit.” As the crisis worsened, the
United States temporarily adopted capital control
and an embargo on net direct investment
12
outflows to continental Europe.

If the U.S. introduction of subpart F rules can
be seen as a precursor to more stringent capital
control policies before the Bretton Woods system
collapsed, China’s 2007 introduction of antideferral rules and other measures for
strengthened residence-country taxation can be
viewed, conversely, as vulnerable from the start to
China’s becoming a major capital exporter and the
consequent reversals of Chinese capital control
and commercial policies. Essentially, many of the
EITL’s provisions applicable to Chinese
companies’ foreign activities immediately went
into a mode of indefinite nonenforcement.
That is most obvious in the application of the
management and control criterion of corporate
residence. Most of the Chinese companies listed
on the U.S. and Hong Kong stock exchanges —
ranging from Alibaba and Tencent today to tech
favorites of the past such as Sina, Sohu, Baidu,
NetEase, and Ctrip — are incorporated overseas
but managed and controlled in China. Indeed,
even the companies’ shareholder meetings are
generally convened in China. Yet few, if any, have
been deemed by Chinese tax authorities to have
13
Chinese tax residence. Although those
“roundtripping” corporate structures — with
layers of holding companies inserted between
operating companies in China and Chinese
shareholders — historically served to exploit
regulatory loopholes and tax preferences offered
to foreign investors, nowadays they also offer a
generally available and widely used form of de
facto corporate inversion that reduces residencebased taxation of foreign income.
The uses of that tax structure have also been
unimpeded by Chinese CFC rules (which would
be applicable to domestic shareholders). There
have been few reports of the enforcement of CFC

13

11

President John F. Kennedy’s Special Message to the Congress on
Taxation (Apr. 20, 1961). The same policy objective of discouraging
capital exports led to the adoption of the interest equalization tax to
make it less profitable for U.S. investors to purchase foreign securities;
see the Interest Equalization Tax Act of 1963 (H.R. 8000).
12

Atish R. Ghosh and Mahvash S. Qureshi, “What’s in a Name? That
Which We Call Capital Controls,” IMF Working Paper WP/16/25, at 1819 (2016).

TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, VOLUME 103, JULY 12, 2021

In 2009 the SAT adopted a rule that in effect permitted corporate
taxpayers to elect Chinese tax resident status. SAT, “Notice Regarding
the Treatment of Chinese-Controlled, Foreign-Registered Enterprises as
Resident Enterprises Under the ‘Body of Substantive Management’
Test,” Guoshuifa [2009] 82 (Apr. 22, 2009). Some taxpayers that repatriate
dividends to China have made that election to take advantage of the
intercorporate dividend exemption, but there is no incentive to make it if
deferral is the objective. For discussion of that rule as a measure to
facilitate state-owned companies’ tax planning, see Cui, “Taxation of
State-Owned Enterprises: A Review of Empirical Evidence From China,”
in Regulating the Visible Hand? The Institutional Implications of Chinese State
Capitalism 122-124 (2015).
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rules in China, even though the continued use of
offshore structures by listed companies and the
extent of foreign earnings are regularly disclosed
in their financial statements. Meanwhile, there is
empirical evidence of rapidly growing uses of tax
haven subsidiaries by companies headquartered
15
in China, public or private.
Further signs of the Chinese government’s
intent to lower taxation of the foreign income of
Chinese companies emerged in the application of
foreign tax credit rules. In 2011 the MOF and SAT
granted permission to China’s state-owned
petroleum companies to elect out of the percountry FTC limitation. The only condition on
that election is that taxpayers must adhere to it for
five years. The agencies also relaxed indirect FTC
rules so that foreign taxes paid by subsidiaries
indirectly owned by Chinese taxpayers through
up to five tiers of indirect shareholding can give
rise to FTCs when dividends are repatriated.
Under prior policies, indirect FTCs would not be
available for earnings below the third-tier
subsidiary.16 In 2017 the MOF and SAT released
rules that gave all taxpayers access to similar FTC
17
benefits.
If that trickle of increasingly favorable
treatment of outbound investment seems too
obscure and to offer only indirect evidence of the
Chinese government’s gradual abandonment of
worldwide taxation, developments in 2020 help to
dispel doubt. On June 1 none other than the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party itself released — jointly with the State
Council — a 15-year grand plan for establishing a
Hainan free trade port. The plan envisions that
the province of Hainan will become a trade,
investment, and finance hub comparable to
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Dubai — but much
larger. Not surprisingly, the Hainan port would be
supported by a plethora of tax preferences. The
Central Committee and State Council announced

that the corporate tax rate for companies
established in the Hainan free trade port and in
favored industries would be reduced to 15
18
percent.
More importantly, the plan contemplates
complete CIT exemption for foreign income
earned by Hainan companies in favored
industries — namely, tourism, modern services,
and high and new technology industries.
Although the exemption is supposed to last only
until 2025, given the long-term horizon of the
Hainan undertaking and the Chinese
government’s record of repeatedly extending CIT
19
preferences, it would be surprising if the
exemption was not renewed. According to MOF
and SAT guidance, for the exemption to apply, the
minimum statutory — not effective — tax rate of
the foreign jurisdiction where the income arises
must be 5 percent.20
Overall, therefore, China’s retreat from the
rigorous residence-based taxation initially
announced in the EITL has been unidirectional
and suggests that China’s choice of the worldwide
taxation approach in 2007 was inadvertent. If the
EITL had been submitted to the legislature for
vote a few years later, the drafters may well have
chosen to copy the exemption system instead.
After all, if there is ever any fear that too much
capital would leave China for tax reasons (despite
low effective CIT rates), the Chinese government
could simply use the levers of capital control to
reduce that outflow.
Of course, China’s retreat from the worldwide
toward the territorial system in corporate taxation
represents a convergence with the world’s
advanced economies. Like many other countries,
China may have simply found it irresistible to
subsidize the business expansion abroad of
national champions. That would also be
consistent with evidence that Chinese companies’
foreign activities increasingly resemble the
activities of companies from advanced
economies. A recent study showed that in

14

The rare reported cases of enforcement present exceptions that
prove the rule. See, e.g., Jinji Wei, “Increasing Chinese Tax Risk for CFCs’
Undistributed Profits,” Tax Notes Int’l, Aug. 21, 2017, p. 754.
15

Katarzyna Bilicka, Yaxuan Qi, and Jing Xing, “Geographical
Diversification of Tax Havens: How Did the Use of Tax Haven
Subsidiaries Change in Recent Years?” Working Paper (2020).
16

See Cui, supra note 13, at 124.

17

MOF and SAT, “Notice Regarding Improving Tax Credit Policies
for Enterprise Foreign Income,” Caishui [2017] 84 (Dec. 28, 2017).
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18

One may expect that to be only the headline rate, given that, as
discussed in Section I, supra, lower CIT rates of 5 percent and 10 percent
have been applied to China’s most profitable SMPEs.
19

For example, the SMPE temporary tax reduction had been
extended for over a decade.
20

MOF and SAT, “Notice Regarding Preference Enterprise Income
Tax Policies for the Hainan FTP,” Caishui [2020] 31 (June 23, 2020).
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mergers and acquisitions, Chinese companies
behave similarly to non-Chinese companies in
21
many respects. An IMF study suggests that other
than having a greater propensity to lend to
emerging markets and developing economies,
Chinese financial institutions engaged in
outbound lending behave similarly to financial
institutions from advanced economies.22 Both
studies offer evidence that the impact of the Belt
and Road Initiative is limited, implying that
standard market considerations often drive
outbound investments.
There are even plenty of parallels between
China’s outbound tax policies and past U.S. policy
choices. After abandoning the Bretton Woods
system, the United States took important steps to
enhance the competitiveness of U.S. businesses
abroad. Although the attempt to emulate the
European exemption system through a series of
income tax regimes favoring exports was
unsuccessful and found to be inconsistent with
23
WTO rules, other measures, such as the costsharing and check-the-box regulations, delivered
similar benefits. In fact, because much
multinational activity today involves trade in
services — for example, pharmaceutical
inventions and digital services — countries have
relatively free rein to subsidize service exports,
given the limited coverage of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services.
The first critical question, therefore, is
whether the G-7’s call for strengthened residencebased taxation is a call to end the long-running
competition (especially among advanced
economies) of export subsidies through the
income tax system. That is clearly different from
the way both G-7 lawmakers and the press have
characterized the global race to the bottom —
which is as one among countries trying to attract
capital inflows (either as destinations or as
conduits of capital flows). Another important
question is whether any consensus includes
21

Clemens Fuest et al., “What Drives Chinese Overseas M&A
Investment? Evidence From Micro Data,” 3 EconPol Working Paper
33/2019 (Nov. 2019).
22

Eugenio Cerutti, Catherine Koch, and Pradhan Swapan-Kumar,
“Banking Across Borders: Are Chinese Banks Different?” IMF Working
Paper WP/20/249 (2020).
23

David L. Brumbaugh, “A History of the Extraterritorial Income
(ETI) and Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) Export Tax-Benefit
Controversy,” Congressional Research Service (2004).
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commitments to adopt minimum tax rules or
merely a commitment not to object to other
countries’ adoption of those rules.
III. Making Doing Business in China Compelling
During the first few years after the EITL took
effect in 2008, China’s SAT issued several informal
policy directives to crack down on tax avoidance
by foreign companies. One policy announced in
200924 introduced criteria for beneficial ownership
(required for claiming treaty benefits) that were
much stronger than the watered-down beneficial
ownership notion then expounded by the OECD
model convention commentaries. Another policy
introduced that year applied the EITL general
antiavoidance rule to disregard offshore entities
and tax capital gains realized on indirect sales or
25
transfers of the shares of Chinese companies. The
SAT also made a statement of policy through the
U.N. Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for
Developing Countries, claiming that
considerations of “location saving advantages”
required the allocation of more multinational
26
profits to China as a producer jurisdiction.
All those policies were declared well before
the OECD launched its base erosion and profitshifting project. Although China is not an OECD
member, the SAT’s antiabuse policies made China
a perhaps welcome observer to the work of the
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs during the
project. But China’s input into whatever
negotiations went on in the original BEPS project
was likely limited. It may be hard to remember,
but because the OECD’s inclusive framework was
not formed until 2016 — a fact routinely written
out of narratives about international tax
cooperation — the adoption of unilateral policy

24

SAT, “Notice on the Understanding and Determination of
‘Beneficial Owner’ in Tax Agreements,” Guoshuihan [2009] 601 (Nov. 5,
2009). For discussion, see Li, supra note 9, at section 5.12.
25

SAT, “Notice on Strengthening the Management of Enterprise
Income Tax Collection on Proceeds From Equity Transfers by NonResident Enterprises,” Guoshuihan [2009] 698 (Dec. 10, 2009). See Cui,
“Taxing Indirect Transfers: Improving an Instrument for Stemming Tax
and Legal Base Erosion,” 33 Va. Tax Rev. 653 (2014).
26

See Sébastien Gonnet, “Location Specific Advantages — China,”
10/11 Transfer Pricing Int’l J. 261 (Oct. 2011); Richard T. Ainsworth and
Andrew Shact, “Transfer Pricing: UN Practical Manual — China,”
Boston Univ. School of Law Public Law Research Paper No. 14-1 (2014);
and Kane, “Location Savings and Segmented Factor Input Markets: In
Search of a Tax Treaty Solution,” 41 Brook. J. Int’l L. (2016).
The extent to which Chinese tax authorities actually implemented
the SAT’s conceptual declaration is less clear.
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initiatives by various countries was regarded as a
faux pas at best, and certainly not worthy of trade
wars or arduous efforts at international
consensus.
When China hosted the G-20 meeting in
Hangzhou in September 2016, the SAT’s antiabuse
credentials in international taxation provided
China’s political leaders with ready talking points.
But in reality, after 2013, the SAT’s antiabuse
initiatives against nonresidents came to be seen as
inconsistent with larger policy initiatives — much
as the EITL antiabuse measures for taxing
residents’ foreign income succumbed to the
reversal of China’s capital control policy. First and
foremost, Premier Li Keqiang launched a forceful
campaign to improve China’s business
environment that resulted in the country’s
spectacular rise in the World Bank’s “Doing
Business” rankings from 91st place in 2013 to 31st
place in 2020. Most of the measures under that
campaign involved reducing red tape and
eliminating government approval requirements.
That has had a notable impact on the way
Chinese tax authorities handle foreign investors.
For example, the SAT announced new procedures
for claiming treaty benefits in 2015, according to
which supporting documents had to be filed only
with the payer or withholding agent — not local
27
tax authorities — for approval. In 2019 the
enforcement of beneficial ownership rules was
further relaxed when the SAT ushered in a
remarkable, pre-FATCA U.S.-style regime for
claiming treaty benefits: Eligibility became
completely self-assessed, without a requirement
to submit supporting documents — even with the
28
withholding agent.
Aggressive enforcement against foreign
investors may also have come to be viewed as
politically incorrect. The SAT proposed
strengthened antiabuse measures on cross-border
29
transactions in September 2015, only to drop
them after encountering broad objections in
public comments. That happened just as the

OECD was beginning to market its finalized BEPS
actions, but that auspicious timing was
apparently not enough for the SAT to go against
the new, pro-foreign-investor policy direction
chosen by China’s political leaders. As readers of
Tax Notes International may have realized, China
has recently been the source of far fewer reports
of, for example, guerilla warfare launched by
Chinese local tax authorities against foreign
indirect transfers, government transfer pricing
victories, and treaty benefit denials. Instead, tax
cuts have become perhaps the most important
theme in tax news from China.
Some tax practitioners suggest that China’s
recent turnaround in its approach to taxing
nonresidents is attributable to tax competition
and reflects a strong reaction to U.S. enactment of
30
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in 2017. The narrative
that China is engaged in tax competition with the
United States certainly has some currency in
Chinese business (and even policy) circles, but it
seems unlikely to stand up to scrutiny. For one,
even after the enactment of the TCJA, China’s
headline corporate tax rate of 25 percent is still
lower than the combined federal and state
corporate tax rates in most U.S. states. And
Chinese local governments engage in plenty of
domestic tax competition to drive down effective
corporate tax rates even further.31 Moreover, even
though the TCJA lowered U.S. corporate rates, the
base erosion and antiabuse tax increased the tax
burden on foreign investors. That should have
eased — not increased — competitive pressure to
attract foreign investment.
In any case, both the size of China’s economy
and its still-operative capital control system make
it unlikely that the country would compete for
capital through tax policy. Instead, tax policy is
better seen as being merely complementary to a
government’s general policy regarding further
attracting foreign direct investment. In the past
decade, China has displayed greater willingness
to grant market access to foreign investors. That is
motivated in part by the desire to ease trade
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tension, in part by the hope to obtain reciprocal
market access in foreign markets, and in part
simply by the lowered need for protectionist
32
policies. Because China is clearly no longer
interested in just remaining the world’s factory
floor and is on its way to becoming a leading
nation in technology, finance, and other tradable
services, allowing greater market access to
foreigners may be a logical choice. Offering tax
incentives — especially regional tax incentives
that are already used as a result of purely
domestic tax competition — is not a hard decision.
After all, like most other large economies, China
does not depend on taxing foreigners for revenue.
Two considerations regarding China’s
preferential regimes for foreigners deserve special
comment. They apply both to purely domestic
regional preferential regimes (such as the Hainan
free trade port and several other free trade zones
in China) and, more prominently, to Hong Kong.
First, low-tax jurisdictions like Hong Kong
play an important role even just for China’s own
tax system. Hong Kong allows China to impose a
lower tax on mobile capital, and even on some
mobile labor, and thereby mitigates the pressure
to lower taxes more generally for all labor and
capital in the country. When Chinese bankers and
fund managers can effectively operate from Hong
Kong instead of Shanghai or Beijing, China faces
less need to create preferential PIT regimes in the
latter cities — and therefore less need to lower tax
rates in the country as a whole. Similarly, in
liberally allowing holding companies to be set up
in Hong Kong and tolerating the Chinese version
of corporate inversions, China simultaneously
gives its companies access to foreign portfolio
capital and segregates the taxation of domestic
and international portfolio capital. Thus, even
though Hong Kong’s tax system and fiscal policies
are different from China’s, the Chinese
government should be thought of as invested in
Hong Kong’s low-tax system.
There is much evidence consistent with that
view. For instance, although China strengthened
beneficial ownership rules in 2009, it relaxed the
rules in a somewhat secret fashion for Hong Kong

33

in 2013. Treaty shopping is at least a lesser sin,
and perhaps even a desired outcome, when the
treaty is with Hong Kong.
Second, Hong Kong’s status as a leading
global financial center is important for China’s
global economic strategies. Although China may
well aspire to host a greater number of global
financial hubs — whether in Hainan, Shanghai, or
elsewhere — low taxation of financial capital is
likely to remain an essential component of policy
packages to nurture those hubs. Thus, any global
minimum tax proposal that threatens to shut
down tax incentives for creating financial hubs
should hold China’s attention.
Many salient aspects of U.S. tax policy on
inbound investment are meant to lure financial
capital through low taxes — including, for
example, the tax exemptions for foreign deposit
interest and portfolio interest, as well as the
securities trading safe harbor from net basis
34
taxation of U.S. trade or business. Not only did
those policies break then-prevailing international
35
tax principles when enacted, but they also
remain some of the most distinct features of the
U.S. tax regime for foreign investors.36 More
broadly, it is also relevant that even under the
most ambitious international financial agreement
that the world has known — the Bretton Woods
system for maintaining currency exchange
stability — the two major sponsors of the system,
the United States and the United Kingdom,
refrained from international cooperation to
promote their own financial institutions and
centers. The Bank of England and the U.S.
Treasury tolerated the emergence of a Eurodollar
market to keep London as an international
financial center, and the United States declined to
cooperate in enforcing other countries’ outflow
37
restrictions. That suggests that insofar as new
international tax agreements may encroach on the
33
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development of new financial centers, China (and
other countries sponsoring those kinds of centers)
should be wary.
IV. Multilateralism: Why Not?
Summarizing the discussion so far, the main
components of China’s tax policy that may have a
bearing on the G-7’s global minimum tax platform
appear to be the following: China relies on the CIT
for revenue more than does the United States, and
its CIT revenue has been strong despite recent
substantial tax cuts for small companies and a
proliferation of local preferential regimes.
Although the foreign activities and profits of
Chinese multinationals have likely risen in
absolute terms in the past decade, it is unknown
how much the share of foreign profits in the same
companies’ total profits has risen.
In any case, there is no sign that China, in the
absence of new international agreements, wants
to tax its multinationals’ foreign profits more to
raise additional revenue. Instead, it has taken
notable measures to reduce that taxation by
continuing to tolerate its version of corporate
inversions, relaxing FTC rules, unevenly
enforcing CFC rules, and experimenting with
territorial taxation. It had many examples to
follow in policies adopted by advanced
economies such as the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Japan.
China also presents itself as more open to
foreign investment than ever. Without any clear
threat of external tax competition, the SAT has
toned down the antiabuse policies and
pronouncements against nonresident taxpayers it
issued just after the EITL’s enactment. Preferential
income tax measures are now regularly offered in
policy packages supporting domestic trade and
investment hubs. Hong Kong as a low-tax
jurisdiction and global financial center adjacent to
mainland China is also playing an ever-moreentrenched role in China’s own tax system. Before
and unless it is replaced by some purely domestic
jurisdiction that serves as a hub of global financial
capital, Hong Kong will likely remain vital to
China’s global economic strategy.
What does all that imply for China’s response
to the G-7’s global minimum tax proposal? As
stated, the answer depends on what is in that
proposal — and the proposal’s substance will also
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determine the forms of international cooperation
China may be expected to participate in.
Consider, for instance, a simplified
characterization of the global minimum tax
proposal based on the OECD’s pillar 2 blueprint:
An income inclusion rule (IIR) and an undertaxed
payment rule (UTPR) will be used to ensure that
multinationals bear a minimum effective tax rate
on their profits. Two questions can be raised about
how those two rules will work. The first is
whether they will be made mandatory in an
international consensus — that is, whether they
are minimal standards to be adopted by all
participants in an international agreement.38 The
second is how strong the rules will be and
whether there will be extensive carveouts. Those
questions are related because mandatory
requirements on a large group of countries will
also likely be much weaker in substance.
Suppose the minimum tax proposal does not
impose any strict requirement that countries enact
the IIR or UPTR. Instead, countries would simply
agree that the imposition of those rules is
permitted, even if some may otherwise view them
as violating “prevailing international tax policy
principles.”39 That leaves some countries to form a
40
“coalition of the willing” to impose the rules.
And the expectation of some of those countries —
at least the United States — is that countries not
part of the coalition will be encouraged to adopt
the IIR or UTPR because they stand only to gain
from adopting, given the adoption by the initial
coalition countries.
Should China be expected to join the initial
coalition of the willing? It seems the answer
should be no. Consider first the IIR: Rigorous
worldwide taxation of corporate income (of the
kind the United States introduced during the
Bretton Woods era) is a well-known approach to
international taxation, and its adoption by many
countries has long represented a loose coalition of
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the willing. Early adoptions of that approach were
uncoordinated, and there is little evidence that
countries like the United Kingdom and Japan
began to defect only because they could not bind
other countries to adopt (there seems to be no
evidence of any attempt to bind others).
China also wrote the principles of worldwide
taxation of corporate income into its legislation,
but from the start was not prepared to enforce
them. That suggests that the benefits of rigorous
worldwide corporate taxation for China were
unclear, regardless of the strategic decisions of
other countries. Because countries that do not join
the initial coalition in adopting the IIR have the
option of adopting it later — in fact, the United
States predicts that other countries will adopt
those rules once the UTPR is in place in enough
countries — it seems that a better strategy is to
wait to decide on adoption. (That argument, of
course, applies to most countries, not just China.)
By the same token, China should not want to
join the initial coalition to adopt the UTPR either.
Any country may adopt the UTPR either to force
other countries to adopt the IIR or to simply raise
revenue (while leveling the playing field for
multinationals). If China is unlikely to join the
initial IIR coalition, it seems unlikely that it would
be interested in forcing other countries to adopt
the rule. Moreover, judging by its policy choices in
the last decade, China does not appear to be
keenly interested in raising more revenue from
foreigners or removing any tax advantage for
other countries’ multinationals.
In short, if the global minimum tax proposal
of the G-20 and inclusive framework does not
require most participating countries to adopt the
IIR and UTPR, China would probably not be an
initial adopter. In the meantime, because China
has not purported to be the arbiter of what
international tax policy principles are acceptable,
it presumably would not have the power to stop
adoption by a small group of other countries,
either. Thus, whether it is able to support a
multilateral agreement would depend mainly on
what stake it has in the pillar 1 blueprint.
If, on the other hand, the global minimum tax
proposal requires most countries to commit to
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adopting specific new practices — such that it
must be made acceptable to countries such as
Ireland and Singapore — then China will
presumably work to ensure that the resulting
international agreement at least does no more
damage to Hong Kong (and other aspiring trade
and financial hubs in China) than it does to the
likes of Ireland and Singapore. Further, it would
make sure that its obligations under any
mandatory IIR would be no more burdensome
than the obligations on other advanced
economies.
Are there decisive considerations for China
under pillar 1? The answer again appears to be no.
China does not have any DST to withdraw. Nor
does it rely on taxation of its multinationals’
foreign profits such that whether those profits are
allocated to other countries for taxation would
make a significant difference. Regarding whether
China might gain revenue by virtue of pillar 1
allocation to itself, it seems unlikely that the
revenue would really matter to China so much
that it would be determinative in the country’s
position in international negotiations.
In conclusion, it seems the G-7’s global
minimum tax proposal offers China plenty of
opportunities to act as a good multilateralist
(President Xi’s favorite role).41 That is because if
obligations are created under any new
international tax agreement, multilateralism can
serve as a way to weaken those obligations so as
to minimize harms to China’s competitive
position as a rising center for global finance.
On the other hand, if few obligations are
created under the new international tax
agreement, China also has nothing to lose through
participating. In those ways, one can even say that
China’s interests in the upcoming international
negotiations are aligned with the OECD’s.
Whether they are with the United States’ is a
different question.
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